Patents and free trade make strange bedfellows. For most of their history, patents have been instruments deployed to resist trade with other countries, not to enhance it. Whether one looks at Venetian laws that punished citizens who practiced local crafts outside the city, the Mercantilist uses to which patents were put in Elizabethan England, or the cartels of the 19th and 20th centuries created on a foundation of interlocking patent rights, patents have had a distinctly protectionist function. It is thus (...) ironic that it is intellectual property rights in general, and patents in particular, that have been held up in recent years as the poster child of much that is wrong with globalization and free trade. Nowhere is this more so than in debates concerning international human rights law and patents, in particular the position that patents violate an international right to health. (shrink)

In remote regions of the eastern Andaman, into the 1990s, a remarkable rapport with nature's forces was occurring.1 Most strikingly expressed during adolescence, it emerged spontaneously from a local type of consciousness. Both the capability and the underlying consciousness were conceived within a pervasive milieu of lushly sensual infant nurture.2 So dependable was the pattern of affection, it spawned a tactile language long before onset of speech. Speech, learning and sociality then followed in the eros‐driven paradigm already set. So did (...) a rare rapport with nature's forces.With nothing in the culture to discourage it, eros was not walled‐off as children grew. It remained firmly at the root of consciousness on through teens. To be a child out in those seas was to move spontaneously and digressively out into life pursuing sundry passion pulses. When erotic power escalated during adolescence, rapport with natural forces dramatically increased. Spectacular gambolings with nature began bursting forth—sometimes astonishingly complex rhythmic ones. No clouds of moody adolescent angst discouraged spontaneity; no flattening of affect suppressed adolescent verve; no emotional dissimulation confounded purpose. Adolescence was a time for a blossoming of affect, for melding deeply and dynamically with habitat. It was a time to profoundly dance with nature's forces.Possessing a protean character, love lies more fluidly within the human frame than language. Following its own inner protocols, love seems able to evade the stable kinds of labeling required for logical inquiry. In exotic cultures it is hard to see at all. In the eastern Andaman, its workings were initially invisible to Western eyes. It was necessary to firm up subliminal awarenesses before the workings out of eros could even be detected there. Though difficult to deal with scientifically, love plays such a profound role in the affairs of humankind that it begs experimental types of scrutiny.A fracturing of love into Bacchanalian and Sublime occurred during the early Greek foundations of Western culture. Out of that schism Western ethos grew. The ethos molded the Western type of consciousness. In the eastern Andaman, eros was not cleaved at all. It shaped a type of psyche not countenanced by the West since its prehistory. (shrink)

I am often asked how one finds isolated people whose whereabouts or existence is unsure. There is even greater curiosity about how one can join such people in the absence of common customs or spoken language. Moreso about how one makes sense of what one sees under such circumstances. After several years of contact with variously acculturated groups of settled and semi‐settled sea nomads in the Sea of Andaman Moken, Moklen, and Urak Lawoi (and its Lonta subgroup) two out‐of‐the‐blue opportunities (...) unexpectedly occurred to travel with fully nomadic pagan ones, a type no longer thought to exist. The first trip was short, but it prepared me for the long next one. The first was a band of unknown origin, the second an aboriginal Moken‐related group off southern Burma. (shrink)

Over 200 health journals call on the United Nations, political leaders, and health professionals to recognize that climate change and biodiversity loss are one indivisible crisis and must be tackle...

Taxation and government policy related to it have only episodic appearance in classical Protestant ethical sources. Of the early sixteenth century reformers, Luther gave most attention to the subject, justifying taxation in general as necessary for the just service of government to the public good and calling the princes to spend tax monies for that good rather than their own luxury. Calvin made much the same claims but called more clearly for official church scrutiny of all government than did Luther. (...) Two centuries later John Wesley criticized English tax policy, appealing to standards of economic efficiency and compassion for the poor with little reference overtly to theology. The churches of colonial and post-revolutionary America developed no systematic, theologically rooted rationale for taxation ethics, either; but official Protestant denominational concern for such ethics has grown measurably in the most recent fifteen years. After a survey of these recent national church statements, and on the basis of them and the slender Protestant heritage on this issue, we end by posing four questions which we see as worthy of much serious thinking by contemporary American Protestant ethicists and church bodies. (shrink)

Efforts by governments, firms, and patients to deliver pioneering drugs for critical health needs face a challenge of diminishing efficiency in developing those medicines. While multi-sectoral collaborations involving firms, researchers, patients, and policymakers are widely recognized as crucial for countering this decline, existing incentives to engage in drug development predominantly target drug manufacturers and thereby do little to stimulate collaborative innovation. In this mini review, we consider the unexplored potential within pharmaceutical regulations to create novel incentives to encourage a diverse (...) set of actors from the public and private spheres to engage in the kind of collaborative knowledge exchange requisite for fostering enhanced innovation in early drug development. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America. By E. Richard Brown.

Richard Barbrook demonstrate that Americans are very good at doing the contrary of what they are supposed to abide by, i.e. capitalist commodification, and engage instead in a digital economy based on exchange, sharing and the free gift labor, idea, and practices. The tone may be ironic, or downwar facetious, but that should not detract from the issue at stake : the cyberage end of the line for a ’cognitive’ capitalism that will prove unable to surmount the « irresoluble (...) contradictions » of its own making. (shrink)

One of Marx‘s and Engels‘ main claims (hereafter ―original Marxism) in their account of the historical ―inevitability of the collapse of capitalism is that one‘s material (economic) conditions, not one‘s ideas, arguments or philosophy, determines one‘s ―consciousness and actions. However, the self-reference in this characterization of philosophical views generates a paradox analogous to the 7th century B.C. Epimenides ―Liar paradox. The Epimenides-paradox arises when Epimenides, a Cretan, states that all Cretans are liars. Epimenides-statement is paradoxical in the sense that if (...) it is true then it is false. Similarly, the Marxist claim that all philosophers who purport to state the cause of all social changes must be wrong, where Marx and Engels are themselves philosophers stating just such a claim, generates a paradox analogous to the ― Epimenides Liar paradox. This leads to what Engels himself calls a―false consciousness, i.e., a failure to understand the true causes of social change. This paradox can only be escaped by abandoning at least one of original Marxism‘s core doctrines. (shrink)

: The main purpose of this paper is to understand the complex and many-sided nature of the theory of regimes elaborated by Aristotle in Politics III. We identify the main philosophical and conceptual elements that make it possible for the philosopher to accomplish a vigorous defense of the thesis that kingship can be considered, under certain political circumstances, the best form of government. Resumo: A proposta principal do presente artigo é compreender o caráter complexo e multifacetado da teoria dos regimes (...) elaborada por Aristóteles, no livro III da Política, e, por meio disso, identificar os principais elementos filosóficos e conceituais que tornam possível ao filósofo, nesse momento da obra, efetuar uma vigorosa defesa da tese segundo a qual a realeza pode ser considerada, em determinadas circunstâncias políticas, como a melhor forma de governo. (shrink)

The thematic survey of traditional literature uncovered a pressing need to study the M-L figure as a phenomenon in its own right. A design was constructed intending to evoke the figure's full phenomenal appearance. Instead of framing a highly determinate structure wherein a specific question is posed, E presented the figure to naive Ss, simply asking them to describe it. The purpose was to ascertain what naive Ss would perceive if not encumbered by a prior set. In addition, five experiential (...) questions about the descriptive task were included, aiming to elucidate and render intelligible the factual perceptions. The results showed that the M-L figure appears physiognomically. Typical responses exhibiting stylistic variation pointed to the dialectic between perceiver and perceived thing. A second finding was that the perception of equal horizontal lines as unequal emerged as a predominant, but only one of several possible ways of resolving the M-L figure's many perceptual possibilities. In fact, the data revealed a trend that elucidates the conditions which make possible the "M-L effect." Finally, "direction-orientation," a phenomenal variable elucidated by Merleau-Ponty's notions about the body and perception, emerged as the most characteristic way of perceiving the experimental figure. (shrink)

Historically, for Black writers, literary fiction has been a site for transforming the discursive disciplinary spaces of political oppression. From 19th century “slave narratives” to the 20th century, Black novelists have created an impressive literary counter-canon in advancing liberatory struggles. W.E.B. Du Bois argued that “all art is political.” Many Black writers have used fiction to create spaces for political and social freedom—from the early work of Harriet Wilson’s Our Nig; or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black (1859)—to (...) the enduring works of the Harlem Renaissance (Toomer, Hurston, and Schuyler)—to the great revolutionary Black literature after WWII (Wright, Baldwin, Williams)—to contemporary Black writers (Toni Morrison, Edward Jones, Samuel Delany)—Black fictive space continues to be a necessary site for resistance. Black literary fiction is a vast counter-canon to mainstream literature which unquestioningly reinforces global white supremacy, capitalistic political oppressions, and the dominance/subordinance relations upon which they depend. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes the respective aims of Jaspers's and Heidegger's philosophical enterprises with reference to their radically divergent uses of the key terms. It was always been of the essence of Jasper's concept of philosophy that it « appropriate » tradition and validate its own possibilities in « differentiation » from tradition. Accordingly Heidegger is not concerned, as is Jaspers, over the « gold » of the « perennial philosophy » but, against the background of the « question of Being (...) » , over the « destruction » of Western philosophy as such. Jaspers's philosophy attempts to save philosophy in the 20th century in the face of Heideggers's destruction of the ontologicei heritage. Cet article distingue les buts respectifs de Jaspers et de Heidegger en référence à leurs usages divergents des termes clés. Il est de l'essence de la philosophie selon Jaspers de « s'approprier » la tradition et de mettre en évidence ses propres possibilités en se distinguant d'elle. Heidegger n'est pas concerné comine Jaspers par la philosophia perennis mais par la « question de l'être » , par la destruction de la philosophie occidentale. Jaspers tente de sauver la philosophie du XX e siècle face à la destruction par Heidegger de l'héritage ontologique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.3 (2003) 255-259 [Access article in PDF] Illnesses and Likenesses Richard G. T. Gipps IN THIS RESPONSE to Neil Pickering's paper I shall focus only on what he describes as the "strong objection" to the typical use of the likeness argument. The likeness argument, to recap, has it that we can decide whether conditions such as schizophrenia, depression, or alcoholism do or do not (...) deserve the designation of illness depending on whether they possess features which, if they occurred in physical conditions, would enable one to decide for or against the designation. To take an implausible example, if it were decided that it would be enough to describe a physical condition as an illness if it involves pain not caused through injury, then a psychological condition would be appropriately described as an illness just to the extent that it too involved such pain.In arguing against typical deployments of the likeness argument, Pickering finds that it is only on questionable initial descriptions of psychological conditions that such conditions appear to share the features that, in physical conditions, would be taken to be indicative of illness. That is to say, theorists who deploy the likeness argument to urge either the reality or unreality of mental illnesses typically presuppose what both we and they had all along hoped would be demonstrated in their argument. In terms of the above example, we might say that a certain psychological condition can count as an illness if it involves psychic pain. The concept of psychic pain is however (so the argument would have it) contestable; there exist other descriptions that make no reference to pain and in so doing fail to provide what a user of the likeness argument would need to substantiate the claim that a conception of the condition as an illness is more than a façon de parler.By way of arriving at this conclusion the following precondition for the applicability of the likeness argument (Pickering's "assumption" (2)) is insisted on: "That, with respect to the presence or absence of [those features of conditions which features decide whether or not the conditions are illnesses], a condition such as schizophrenia [must be] describable independently of the category it is assigned to." This can seem a quite reasonable restriction, for—it could be said—one can only win an argument if it is first allowed that there is actually something to argue about. That is, it is only if both partisans and detractors of the illness conception first accept a certain description of schizophrenia as spelling out what schizophrenia essentially involves that they can then progress to determining whether or not such a condition so described is or is not an illness.Yet, whereas this seems like a perfectly reasonable requirement, it is I believe uncertain whether it will always capture the form of the intuitions of adherents and detractors of the illness conception—or of the form of philosophical arguments more generally. To be sure, some philosophical discussions can perhaps be reconstructed as debates about the validity of certain inferences [End Page 255] from mutually understood premises (i.e., given X, does Y follow or not?). Yet if this were the case, then genuinely interesting philosophical arguments would probably be few and far between. If we are agreed as to the precise significance of our premises, and are not furthermore just making straightforward mistakes in reasoning, it is hard to see how or why we could all fail to arrive at the same conclusions.In the Philosophical Investigations paragraph 128 Wittgenstein wrote that "If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them" (Wittgenstein 1953). Now that proposition might seem on rather weak grounds, because all one has to do to actually disprove it is merely disagree with it. But presumably Wittgenstein is rather articulating his intuition that although philosophical arguments often take the form of clashes concerning what conclusions can be drawn from what premises, most of their substance comes from a prior failure to unpack the intrinsic significance... (shrink)

Quiconque a visité la Chambre de la Signature, au Vatican, et s’est attardé devant « L’École d’Athènes » de Raphaël garde en mémoire l’image significative qu’offrent, au centre de la composition, les personnages d’Aristote et de Platon. C’est l’image, en raccourci, d’un dialogue poursuivi vingt années durant par le maître de l’Académie et son disciple de Stagire, l’un des plus féconds sans doute qu’ait jamais comptés l’histoire de la pensée philosophique. La première rencontre entre les deux hommes eut lieu probablement (...) au cours de l’année 366/5 avant notre ère. Ils vécurent ensemble, à Athènes, dans un commerce quasi constant, pour ainsi dire jusqu’à la mort de Platon, au mois de mai 347. Cependant, le maître avait laissé pour toujours son empreinte sur l’esprit du disciple. Au point que le lecteur attentif d’Aristote peut avoir l’impression de souvent trouver dans ses œuvres, comme disait Th. Gomperz, le « Platonicien » et l’« Asclépiade » confrontés l’un à l’autre sur toutes les grandes questions de la philosophie. Le difficile accord, parfois constaté dans le Corpus Aristotelicum, entre les thèses recommandées respectivement par l’héritier de l’Académie et le champion d’une philosophie nouvelle pose incontestablement le problème le plus redoutable que doit affronter l’exégèse. (shrink)

Ethical Studies is one of the most enlightening works of moral philosophy in English. This article surveys the principal structural theme running throughout it, but will concentrate on its more explicit development at the beginning and end of the book, Essays II and VI, and the “Concluding Remarks.” Essay II formulates the formal requirements of morality in terms of self-realization, and the remaining Essays survey possible contents, the valuable elements of which are brought together, with further materials, in Essays VI (...) and VII. But Bradley finds that morality involves a contradiction, and so, in order to resolve that contradiction, it issues into something more than morality, namely, religion. However, this article will show that Bradley’s resolution of this contradiction is not satisfactory and that, once morality is conceived as an ἐνέργεια and not a γένεσις, an activity and not a process, this contradiction vanishes. Yet morality does, nevertheless, on Bradley’s own principles, find its completion in religion when so conceived; and such an argument was developed in detail in the great work of one of Bradley’s pupils, A. E. Taylor’s Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I. (shrink)

While different groups of viewers may have sought different values in Cézanne's art, the artist's manner of painting and personality both contributed to the ambiguity of his work. Until the last decade of his life he seldom exhibited, and even then his paintings seemed unfinished. He was generally regarded as an "incomplete" artist and often as a "primitive," one whose art was in some way simple or rudimentary, devoid of the refinements and complexities of his materialistic, industrialized society.1 He was (...) seen as an isolated man who lived apart from other painters and found human relationship and communication difficult. Yet for some symbolists it was this alienation and mystery which made Cézanne's art so attractive. As early as 1891, Fénéon found it appropriate to refer to "the Cézanne tradition," a designation which indicates the influence of the legendary account of the artist promulgated by Gauguin and his associates.2 Gauguin had painted landscapes with the reclusive artist during the summer of 1881, was impressed by his odd style, both personal and pictorial, and in a letter to Emile Schuffenecker of 14 January 1885 described Cézanne as embodying the mysticism of the Orient.3 Such a characterization held special meaning for those like Gauguin who had come more and more to search for an ultimate truth in the experience of the mystical, the transcendental, the intensely real. For the symbolist painter or writer, primitives lived in harmony with the real world; they had an intuitive, mythic understanding of their environment. Most modern Europeans, in contrast, viewed the world through false and short-sighted analytic reason and thus saw only immediate causes and effects, not eternal universal principles. They were Christians who could not see the truth of Buddhism; they were socially indoctrinated Parisians who could not see the purer structure of human society in provincial Brittany; they were refined painters of nature who could not see the expressive power of a flat area of color surrounded by a broad outline. For Gauguin and the symbolists, Cézanne, living in isolation in his seemingly unsophisticated native Provence, qualified as an enlightened contemporary, an inspiring force, a primitive artist. · 1. For Cézanne as "incomplete," see, e.g. Thadée Natanson, "Paul Cézanne." Revue blanche 9 , p. 496; and Gustave Geoffrey, "Paul Cézanne" , in La Vie artistique , p. 218. For Cézanne as "primitive," see, e.g., Georges Lecomte, L'Arte impressionniste , pp. 30-31; and Maurice Denis, "Cézanne" , in Théories, 1890-1910: Du symbolisme et de Gauguin vers un nouvel ordre classique, 2d ed. , p. 246. The late nineteenth-century notion of the "primitive" artist was very broad. Included in the category of primitives were artists of the ancient Orient, artists of the earlier stages of development of various Western styles , provincial or uneducated European artists, and those of contemporary non-European societies. With regard to the negative evaluation of modern Western European society, see, e.g., Victor de Laprade, Le Sentiment de la nature chez les modernes, 2d ed. , pp. 483-88; and Albert Aurier, "Essai sur une nouvelle méthode de critique" , "Le Symbolisme en peinture: Paul Gauguin" , and "Les Isolés: Vincent van Gogh" , in Oeuvres posthumes , pp. 202, 216, 262-63.· 2. Félix Fénéon, "Paul Gauguin" , in Oeuvres plus que complètes, ed. Joan Halperin, 2 vols. , 1:192.· 3. Lettres de Gauguin à sa femme et à ses amis, ed. Maurice Malingue , p. 45. Félix Fénéon, André Mellerio, and Emile Bernard also associated Cézanne's style with mysticism. Richard Shiff is an associate professor of art at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has written a related article, "The End of Impressionism: A Study of Theories of Artistic Expression". His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Art and Life: A Metaphoric Relationship" and, with Carl Pletsch, "History and Innovation". (shrink)

In a recent note in this review (Leibniz e gli Zenonisti, n. 3, 2001, pp. 15-22) Paolo Rossi stresses the importance of a philosophical sect that he claims has been unjustly ignored in accounts of the history of modern philosophy, the Jesuit philosophers of Louvain and Spain of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century known as the Zenonists. The occasion for his complaint is Massimo Mugnai’s admirable new introduction to Leibniz’s thought (Introduzione alla filosofia di Leibniz, Torino, Einaudi, 2001), (...) which in all other respects than its failure to mention the Zenonists, Rossi compliments and commends: justly, for in my opinion it is the best introduction to Leibniz yet written. (shrink)

A number of early modern philosophers deny that corporeal non-minded nature contains efficient or strict causes. For Berkeley the passivity of ideas (hence PI) expresses this view. My aim is to look at two possible arguments – I call them strategy 1, and strategy 2 – Berkeley makes, or others make in his behalf, for PI. I conclude that they are unsatisfactory. I’m particularly interested whether Berkeley’s distinctive doctrine that objects of sense are mind-dependent, i.e., that no corporeal object can (...) exist unperceived, supports PI. I argue it doesn’t. (shrink)